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Abstract
We develop a two-period model applicable to global sourcing by considering a firm
that operates in two markets: one is located in the U.S. and the second is in a country
having a selling season that does not overlap with the U.S.' selling season. Demand for
each market depends linearly on the selling 'price and includes an unknown scale
parameter. We assume that the firm learns from sales in the first market to assist
decision making in the second. We also assume a single procurement opportunity, but
allow the firm to ship leftovers from the first market to the second if doing so is
profitable. Our results include the characterization of the optimal recourse policy, which
represents the firm's decisions made at the beginning of the second selling season after it
observes both sales in the first market and a realized value of the foreign exchange rate.
Additionally, we provide a sufficient condition for reducing the optimization problem to
a maximization over a single variable that we interpret as the safety stock for the first
market. Further,- we provide evidence that the sufficient condition is a rather mild one,
likely to be satisfied in practical applications. We also establish a lower bound on the
optimal value of the first-market safety stock, thereby truncating the search region of the
last decision variable. This lower bound represents the optimal safety stock for the first
market if that decision were made myopically, without regard to its effect on the profit
associated with the second market.

This is a working paper. Please do not cite or quote without permission. Comments on the paper are welcome.

1.0 Introduction
Consider a single. monopolistic finn that operates in two separate markets and
desires to establish the optimal quantity to procure and selling price to set for its product in each
market. The firm offers the same product for sale in both markets. but the selling seasons are
non-overlapping. Consequently. the finn is provided the opportunity to transfer some or all of
the leftovers remaining from the first market

to

the second market for possible sale in the second

selling season. In addition. the respective market demand functions -- each of which are price
dependent and include a scale parameter that is unknown at the start of the first selling season -are correlated perfectly due to homogenous customer preferences. As a result. the firm can
revise its characterization of the unknown demand parameter applicable to the second market by
observing sales in the first market. In particular. if there are leftovers in the first market. then
the finn's sales and demand are equivalent; thus. the finn deduces the value of the unknown
parameter. thereby eliminating the associated uncertainty in the demand function for the second
market. If. however, there are no leftovers in the first market, the firm cannot deduce the value
of the unknown parameter. Consequently, that parameter continues to contribute uncertainty to
the demand function for the second market. although the firm can update its characterization of
that uncertainty based on information obtained from the first market.
We assume that the firm commits to its procurement quantities for both markets
concurrently. at the beginning of the first selling season. We do not require that the firm receive
both its procurement quantities at the beginning of the first selling season, only that it establish
at that time a contractual arrangement governing the specified amount to be delivered at the start
of each selling seasOI1. One motivation for this restriction is the desire to establish a modeling
framework for the firm that negotiates a cost diScount schedule by bringing larger procurement
quantities to the bargaining table. Perhaps a more appropriate motivation, though. is that this
particular procedure is common in the fashion goods and related industries for which often there
exists only one_procurement opportunity.

A key implication of having only one procurement opportunity is that the decision of a
procurement quantity for the second market is made with limited information. Since the firm
learns from its operations in the first market, it fS likely that it would choose a procurement
quantity differently if it were to make its decision after rather than before the tirst selling season.
As recourse, though, the firm has two options. First, it can affect demand in the second market
by changing its selling price. And second, if at the beginning of the second selling season the
firm reaches the conclusion that the amount of stock procured for the second market is less than
it desires, it can supplement its supply by transferring a portion of the leftovers remaining from
the first market. However, this option might provide only limited recourse since the tirm is
constrained by the number of leftovers remaining from the first market. If no leftovers remain
from the first market, then

t~e

firm's resulting management situation represents an application of

a yield-management problem. This is because, in such a case, although the firm's capacity is
tixed, it can affect the trade-off between expected leftovers and expected shortages by altering
market demand through its selling price. (Weatherford and Bodily (1992) provide a general
classification scheme for yield-management problems; the one described here is similar to an
airline or hotel booking problem in which there is only one price class and demand.is uncertain.)

In order to keep general the formulation of this model, we assume that the two markets
are separated by international boundaries, thereby establishing global sourcing as the primary
application. Non-international applications -- e.g., a scenario in which a firm operating in a
single country uses an initial test market before offering a new product for sale in a second
market -- are obtained by fixing the foreign exchange rate at one.
The management situation described above is an extension to a problem
formulated by Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1992), who developed an optimal (profit-maximizing)
strategy for an international firm that sells a fashion good in two, non-overlapping markets. In
their model, Kouvelis and Gutierrez incorporate foreign exchange risk and provide the
alternative of transferring to the second market some portion of the leftovers remaining from the
first market; but, they assume that the selling price is given (for each market) and that the firm is
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provided a second opportunity to procure (at the beginning of the second market). They also
assume that the firm does not learn; that is, the firm does not revise after the first selling season
the uncertainty associated with the second marker.
Other relevant papers appearing either in the operations management or the economics
literature address only aspects of the model considered here. For example, Krouse and Senchack
(1977); Harpaz, Lee, and Winkler (1982); Braden and Freimer (1991); and Nahmias (1993)
incorporate the idea of learning from censored information in their inventory models. but they
assume that the firm's selling price is given rather than incorporate it as a decision variable. On
the other hand, Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977); Lazear (1986); Balvers and
Cosimano (1990); Trefler (1993); and Braden and Oren (1994) develop economic models for
learning the demand curve, but they assume that the firm's stocking quantity is given rather than
incorporate it as a decision variable. Whitin (1955); Mills (1959 and 1960); Karlin and Carr
(1962); Ernst (1970); Zabel (1970 and 1972); Thowsen (1975); Young (1978); and Polaroglu
(1991) study management situations in which the firm's stocking quantity and selling price are
joint decision variables, but these models do not include learning.

2.0 Notation and Assumptions
Define markets 1 and 2 as the domestic and foreign markets, respectively.
Correspondingly, associate selling season i with market i, for i = 1. 2. Then, let Pi denote the
selling price for market i. In addition, let q and I (no subscripts) denote the quantities procured
for markets 1 and 2, respectively. (Recall that I, the quantity procured for market 2, is ordered at
the beginning of the first selling season; consequently, it serves as an initial stock of inventory
already on-hand prior to the time decisions are made for market 2). In addition, designate x as
the number of leftovers from market 1 transferred to market 2 (x

~

market 1 leftovers).

Let c denote the cost of procuring a unit and let 't represent the cost of transferring a unit
from market 1 to market 2. We assume no penalty cost for a lost sale other than forfeited profit.
That is, we let the per-unit goodwill cost of a shortage equal zero. We justify this assumption in
3

two ways. First, each of the two markets has only one selling season. Consequently. goodwill
cost has little meaning. Second, the firm is a price-setter. This means that the firm affects
demand by changing its selling price. Therefor~, the lost goodwill resulting in an unsatisfied
demand can be thought of within the context of the parameters of the demand function. Note,
however, a per-unit cost of goodwill can be included explicitly in the model without changing
the structure of the results. Similarly, we assume that the cost of discarding a unit is zero and
that there is no salvage value. Again, either a per-unit discarding cost or a per-unit salvage value
can be included without difficulty.
Next, consider the demand structure of the two markets. Without loss of generality, we
assume an identical form for the two demand functions (recall that earlier, in order to include
learning in the modeling framework, we specified that the two demand functions are correlated
perfectly). Specifically, let demand be a decreasing, linear function of p and include an initially
unknown scale parameter as an additive term: D(p)

=y(p) + e, where y(p) == a - bp and both a

and b are known, but E is not. Correspondingly, assign F(e) as a subjective cumulative
distribution function to characterize the finn's initial beliefs regarding e and define f(.) = dF(e)
as the probability density function. Also, defme h(e) == f(e)/[l-F(e)] as e's hazard rate; let E[e]
denote the expected value of e and assume -a

~A

$ e ~ B. Further, assume that F(.) is such that

h(.) is a non-decreasing function. Examples of distributions having a non-decreasing hazard rate

include the uniform, normal, and many gamma distributions (refer to Barlow and Proschan
(1975) for a more extensive list).
We choose the firm's domestic currency (e.g., U.S. dollars) as the dimension for all
monetary-related pcu:ameters and variables, including Pz, But, since market demand's
dependency on price is a local phenomenon, we convert P2 to the applicable local currency by
multiplying it by the foreign exchange rate, 11, which, we assume, is a random variable. As a
result, we express the demand function applicable to the second market more appropriately as
D(pl11)

=y(pl11)+ E, where y(pl11) =a - brtP, p is in the domestic currency, and 0 < a. ~ 11 ~ ~.

4

Let <1>(e) and <1>(e) correspond to the cumulative distribution function and probability density
function, respectively, associated with".
Note that we reach this same interpretatibn of the demand function for the second market
if we assume instead that P2 is set in the foreign (local) currency. To demonstrate, let PF denote
the selling price for the second market, set in the foreign currency. Then the (local) demand

=a - bp F +E. Correspondingly, the reyenue generated from sales in the
foreign market is RF =PFmin(a-bpF+E, qFJ, where qF represents the stocking quantity for the
function is DF(PF)

foreign market and RF is in the foreign currency. This revenue (R F ) is converted into the
domestic currency by multiplying it by l!rl, the foreign exchange rate for changing foreign
currency to domestic currency. Thus, the revenue generated from sales in the foreign market,
converted to the domestic currency, is R D = (1In.JRF = (l!rl)PFmin{a-bPF+E, qF). However, by
defining PD

=(l!rl)p F as the selling price for the second market, converted into the domestic

currency, we obtain R D

=pomin(a-l!rlPD+E, qFJ, which leads to the same interpretation of the

demand function applicable to the second market as above.
Notice the following modeling difference between the parameters

E

and". On the one

hand, the value of E is fixed, having associated with it at the beginning of the first selling season
a probability distribution only because its value is unknown to the firm at that time. However,
since the firm learns in the first market, it begins the second selling season better informed with
respect to

E:

either E is known (if demand is observed) or the range of possible values of E is

truncated (if sales are observed). On the other hand, the value of" is random, assuming realized
values at different points in time. However, like Kouvelis and Gutierrez, we assume that 11 is
observed at the start of the second selling season and remains constant for the duration of the
season. This particular assumption is 'convenient because it means that the firm is aware fully of
the foreign exchange rate at the time that it sets its selling price for the second market. This
assumption also is realistic because a firm operating in an environment such as that described
here can purchase (through financial markets) a foreign exchange rate option, thereby allowing it

5

to lock in at a specific rate at any point in time. Let v denote the realized value of 11 observed at

the beginning of the second selling season.
A notable benefit of modeling foreign eXchange risk in the manner described above is
that the uncertainty in foreign exchange is absorbed into demand, thereby providing greater
modeling flexibility. In fact, one of the results of this paper is that no assumptions regarding the
specific form of <1>(e) are required for analytical tractability, which is a characteristic
differentiating the international model developed here from related models of global
manufacturing distribution networks (see Huchzermeier (1991».
Next, we introduce the transformation of variables, Z == q - y(p I), in order to simplify the
mathematical analysis. The definition of z provides a convenient substitution for q because it
yields a compact formula for calculating leftovers or shortages for the first marker. In particular,
if z >

E

(i.e., if q = Y(PI) + z > D(PI) = Y(PI) +

z S; E (i.e., if q S; D(p /)),

E),

then z - E denotes the leftovers in market 1; if

then E - z denotes the shortages in market 1. Also, since safety stock is

defined as the difference between stocking quantity and expected demand, we interpret the
decision variable, Z, as a surrogate for the market 1 safety stock: ss I == q - E[D(PI)]

=q - (y(PI)

+ E[e]) = z - E[E]. In other words, the deviation of z from the mean of the unknown demand

parameter represents the firm's safety stock for market 1. Consequently, if E[e] = 0, then: is
equivalent to ss /. A similar transformation of variables for market 2, although possible, is not
convenient because 1 and P2 are not determined simultaneously.
Finally, we define V(l,z,u,v), W(!,z,v), and IT(Z,PI,!) as follows:
V( I.z.u, v)

=

expected profit associated with market 2 when an optimal policy is followed.
given that at the beginning of the second selling season v is the foreign
exchange rate,

U

denotes the revealed value of E (i.e.,

E

= u), z-u is the number

of leftovers remaining from market 1, and 1 is the initial inventory on-hand.

W(I, u, v) = expected profit associated with market 2 when an optimal policy is followed,
given that at the beginning of the second selling season v is the foreign
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exchange rate, u denotes the lower bound for

E

(i.e.,

£ ~ u),

there are no

leftovers from market 1, and I is the initial inventory on-hand.

TI(z.p 1,1) =

total expected profit for the twb markets combined, computed at the beginning
of the first selling season, given that z, PI, and I are the decisions made at that
time and an optimal recourse policy is followed in the second selling season.

Notice the difference between V(l.z.u.v) and W(l.u.v): the former corresponds to the case in
which leftovers remain from market 1 and consequently, the demand function for market 2 is
deterministic (because £ is known as of the beginning of the second selling season); the latter
corresponds to the complimentary case in which no leftovers remain from market 1 and
consequently, the demand function for market 2 contains uncertainty (because

£

still is not

known as of the beginning of the second selling season).

3.0 Formulation of the Firm's Objective Function
The firm's objective is to choose z, PI, and I such that fI(z,p 1,1) is maximized, where
TI(z.p 1,1) accounts for the fact that the firm chooses optimally its recourse decisions for market 2

(the recourse decisions are P2 and x, which represent the decisions made prior to the second
selling season, but after the firm observes both sales from market 1 and a value for ll). To
develop an expression for fI(z.p 1,1), we consider the sequence of events relevant

to

its

formulation and the corresponding profit implications associated with each event. Note that, in
developing TI(z.p 1,I), we do not discount revenues and costs associated with the second selling
season. This is anarbitrary decision made only as an attempt to provide a less cumbersome
presentation.
At the beginning of the first selling season, the firm chooses PI, thereby establishing the
demand for its product that corresponds to market 1: D(Pl)

=Y(PI) + E, where, recall, £ is

unknown. In addition, the firm procures q = Y(Pl) + z units to stock for possible sale in market

1 and I units to stock for possible sale in market 2 (the I units, however, are not received by the

7

firm until the beginning of the second selling season; hence, the firm incurs no holding costs
associated with l). The total procurement cost is c{y(p1)+z+I).

= y(p I) + Z), the firm satisfies each unit
demanded in market 1-- thereby generating a sales revenue of PID(p I) = P l y(p I) + e) -- and
Then, if E < z (i.e., if D(pI) = y(p I)+E <t q

has

z - e leftovers. In addition, given that the firm acts optimally when choosing its recourse

decisions, the contribution to profit associated with the second selling season is V(I. z. e, v) since.
at the beginning of the second selling season, the firm knows the value of E (e = D(PI) - y(PI),
where D(PI) is known because it is equivalent to market 1 sales).
-

I

If, instead,
y(PI)

e ~ z (i.e., if D(p I)

~

q), the firm sells in market 1 its complete stock of q =

+ z units -- thereby generating a sales revenue of P l y(PI) + z) -- and has no leftovers. In

. addition, given that the firm acts optimally when choosing its recourse decisions, the
contribution to profit associated with the second selling season is W(I.z. v) since, at·the beginning
of the second selling season, the firm knows only that z is the lower bound for E.

In summary, then, the fmn's total, two-market, conditional profit,

P( z,p1'/),

depends on

the relationship between E and z as well as the value of TJ observed at the beginning of the second
selling season:

P(Z.Pl,!)

=-c(Y(PI)+z+I) + {
.

PlY(P/)+E) + V(I,zE, v)

if E <z and TJ=v

Pl(Y(P/)+Z) + W(I,z, v)

if

e~z

and TJ=v

Therefore, the total expected profit is:
(1)

where
B

'f.I(PI) == f(Pl-C)(Y(P/)+u)!(u)du = (P/-C)(y(p/)+E{eJ)

(2)

A

z

B

L(z.PI) == fd...z-u)!(u)du+ f(PI-cXu-z)!(u)du == cA(z)+(PI-c)0(z)

A

z
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(3)

and
re(z.[) " - cl

+

j[f;

V(I, z" v)f(u)du

ex

J$(V )dv +
(

jU:

W(I, l. v)f(u) du

}(V) dv

ex

~

= - cI + f[f; V(I,
ex

z u. v)f(u)du + [l-F(z)]W(I, Z V)]<I>(v)dV

(4)

Equation (2) represents the single-period riskless profit function (Mills, 1959). That is,
the single-period profit for a given price in a certainty-equivalent problem in which

£.

is replaced

by its expected value. Equation (3) often is referred to as the single-period expected loss
function (Silver and Peterson, 1985), which assesses an overage cost (c) for each unit leftover
when z is chosen too large relative to the actual value of E and an underage cost (p 1 - c) for each
unit shortage when z is chosen too small (A(z) == fZ (z-u)f(u)du and 8(z) ==
.
A

f~uz)f(u)du
Z

denote the expected number of leftovers and shortages, respectively). Equation (4) can be
interpreted as the expected profit associated with market 2 given that the firm chooses z and I at
the beginning of the first selling season and then follows an optimal recourse policy after
additional information is provided at the beginning of the second selling season. Thus, (1) can
be interpreted as the sum of the expected profits associated with market 1 and market 2, where
the expected profit associated with market 1 represents the profit that would occur in the absence
of uncertainty, less the expected loss due to uncertainty.
Correspondingly, the firm's objective at the beginning of the first selling season can be
written compactly as:
maximize IT(z. Pl. I)
Z, Pl. I

(5)

Notice from (4) that the profit associated with market 2 does not depend on P/.
Consequently, we can reduce (5) to a function of the two variables, z and I, by expressing PI *,
the optimal selling price for the first market, in terms of z as we would if market 2 did not exist.
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Lemma 1. The optimal selling price for market 1 can be expressed uniquely as a function of z:
*

(

PI == P z) =
.

a+bc+E[Ej-8(z)
.
I
2b

Proof: From (1)-(4), IT(z,p 1'/) is concave in PI for given values of z and I, thereby implying that
P 1* satisfies aIT(z.p 1'/)/dPI

= 0:

and

..

PI

*

= a+bc+E[Ej-8(z)
2b

o

Since the expected number of shortages, 8(z), is non-increasing in z, p(z) is non-decreasing in.:;.
Substituting PI *

=p(z) into (5) reduces the firm's optimization problem to a

maximization over only z and I:
maximize IT (z, p(z), I)

z,I

(6)

Even given this reduced fonn of the firm's objective function, the determination of z* and 1* -the optimal values of z and I, respectively -- is not straightforward because the computation
depends on the structure of the finn's optimal recourse policy associated with market 2. That is.
the solution to (6) requires an expression for V(I,z,u,v) and for W(I,z, v), each of which
corresponds to a new maximization problem over the market 2 decision space, given the market

1 decisions z and I as well as the information revealed at the end of the first selling season.
Therefore, we next develop V(I,z,u, v) and W(I,z, v) by considering that each represents the
optimal value function of a distinct sub-problem in which an initial level of inventory is onhand, leftovers from market 1 may be transferred to market 2, but no additional units may be
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procured. The key difference between the two sub-problems is that one includes a deterministic
demand function (the sub-problem in which V(I.z.u, v) denotes the optimal value function) and
the other includes an uncertain demand functiod (the sub-problem in which W(I.z. v) denotes the
optimal value function).

4.0 Computation of V(l,z,u,v): A Deterministic Sub-Problem With Limited Capacity
If E. <

z (i.e., if leftovers remain after the first selling season), then no uncertainty

surrounds E. at the start of the second selling season. In other words. the presence of leftovers
after the first selling season implies that the number of sales in market 1 is equivalent to the
amount demanded. And, given that the demand for market 1 is known, the firm can deduce the
value of E.. In particular, E.

= market 1 demand - y(p/).

Equivalently, the firm can determine E.

from the number of leftovers remaining from the first selling season: E. = market 1 leftovers - z:.
For the purpose of this section, we assume that the firm observes at the beginning of the second
selling season that E. = u (i.e., there are
Since there are

z - u leftovers remaining from market 1).

z - u leftovers remaining from market 1, the firm can supplement its

initial inventory on-hand (of I units) for market 2 by transferring x

~Z-

u units from market 1 at

a per-unit cost of 'to Thus, given that at the beginning of the second selling season the firm sets

= v (for the foreign exchange rate), it enters market 2
with I + x units available in stock to satisfy a market demand of D(P2Iv) =Y(P2Iv) + u = a its selling price at pz and observes that T]

bVP2 +

U

units, where u is known. Since demand for market 2 is a deterministic function of the

selling price, we invert D(P2Iv), making D2 the decision variable and p( D 2)

= (a + 1I - Dz)/bv

the associated (deterministic) demand-dependent price function. Correspondingly.
market 2 sales =: S(D 2,x,I)

= min(D2. I+x)

The contribution to profit associated with market 2, given that an optimal recourse policy is
followed (for this sub-problem, which is defined for z > E. =: u) now can be written as:
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(7)

V(!.z.U.

V)

=

max{p(D2 )S(D2. X .I)-1.X}
D2' x

s.t.

(8)

a $;

x

$;

z-

u

In effect, the firm has two sources of stock for market 2. The first source (51) refers to
initial inventory on-hand and the second source (52) refers to the leftovers remaining from
market 1. But, since the capacity of the first source is I units and the capacity of the second
source is

z - u units, the firm can satisfy demand only up to the maximum amount of D 2 = [

+

z-

u units.

Next, define x* and D 2 * as the values of x and D 2 , respectively, that satisfy (8), and
notice from (7) and (8) that D2 * $; I implies x* = O. Intuitively, this is because the firm should
not pay 1 in order to ship a unit from market 1 to market 2 if there already are enough units onhand at market 2 to meet all demand. An alternative explanation is that the firm should not plan
intentionally for a transferred unit to be a leftover after ~e second selling season since the perunit cost of such a leftover is 1. Similarly, we conclude that D2 * $; I + x* because p( D2) is
decreasing in D 2 and S(D2,x,!) is constant in D 2 for D z ~ I+x. In other words, the firm should
not plan intentionally for shortages in market 2 since

~e

penalty of such a shortage is forfeited

revenue for each of the sales. Furtheranalysis of (8) indicates that the firm's optimal recourse
policy for the case when

z > E includes four possibilities.

Theorem 1. Given that at the beginning of the second selling season Tl

=v. E = u, Z-u is the

number ofleftovers remaining after the first selling season, and I is the initial inventory onhand, the firm's optimal recourse policy, (x*,P2 *) is:

(x*. P2*)

=

(z-u. p(I+z-u)

if 1< D(1)-(Z-U)

(D('t)-I, p(D('t)))

if

(0,

if D(":) < [< D(O)

p( l)

if

(0. p( D(O)))
where D(lC)

=(a+u-bvlC)12 andp(D) = (a + u-D)/bv.
12

D('t)-(z-u)::; I::; D('t)

D(O) $; [

Proof: The marginal revenue associated with selling unit D z is:

~[

MR(D ) ==

dD z ?

Z

(D )D ] = -!!.-[(a+U-Dz)Dz ] = a+u-2Dz
2 z
dDZ
bv
bv

which is a decreasing linear function of D z. The marginal cost associated with acquiring unit D]
depends on the source from which the unit is obtained. If the unit is acquired from S 1 (i.e.~ from
the initial inventory on-hand), the marginal cost is 0: MCS1 = O. If the unit is acquired from S2
(i.e., from the leftovers remaining from market 1), then the marginal cost is 't: MC 52

the marginal cost of acquiring unit D z is 0 if Dz : :; I and
U

't

if I < Dz : :; I +

= 'to

Thus,

z - u (recall that I + :: -

is the maximum number of units that the fInn can sell).
Now, consider Figure 1:

MCSZ = 't (per-unit transfer cost)

MCSI =

a (noco~tforunitofinitialsupply)

Ol-------~------

a.;- u -

2

bY,

Dz

a+u
2

MR(D,) =

-

a+u-2D,
bv

Figure 1. Marginal Revenue vs. Marginal Cost
In general, it behooves the firm to increase Dz as long as the marginal revenue associated with
selling an additional unit is no less than the marginal cost of acquiring the unit. According to
Figure 1, then, it is optimal for the fIrm to continue acquiring additional units from S 1 to satisfy
demand as long as D2 :::; (a+u)12 (because then the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit
from S 1 is less than or equal to the marginal revenue associated with selling the unit). Similarly.
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it is optimal for the firm to continue acquiring additional units from S2 to satisfy demand as long
as D 2

~

(a+u-bvt)12 (but. only if the firm first exhausts the total supply of S 1).

Therefore. given that

lis the capacity ors 1, there are three scenarios.

If [~ (a+u)l2,

then D 2 * = (a+u)12 and all units needed to satisfy D 2 * are acquired from S 1. If (a+u-bv't)12 < I

< (a+u)l2. then D2 * = [ and all units needed to satisfy D2 * again are acquired from S 1. (In this
case, the firm exhausts S l's capacity, but it does not tum to S2 for additional supply because the
marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit from S2 exceeds the marginal revenue associated
with selling the unit). However. if I

~

(a+u-bvt)l2, then D2 * = min{(a+u-bvt)l2. l+(z-u)).

where the first I units needed to satisfy D 2 * are acquired from S 1 and the remainder (x*) are
acquired from S2. (In this case. the firm wants to acquire a total of (a+u-bvt)12 - [ units from
S2, but it is restricted by S2's limited supply of z - u units).

0

We now can characterize V(I,z,u,v), which represents the optimal value of the firm's
recourse policy given that € <

V( I, z, u, v)

=

z.

From (8), (7), and Theorem 1:

[(a+2u-I-Z)(I+z-u)lIbv - 't(z-u)

if 1< D('t)-(z-u)

[(a-bvt+u)2]/4bv + 't1

if D('t)-(z-u) ~ I ~ D('t)

[(a+u-l)ll1bv

if D('t) < 1< D(O)

[(a+u)2]/4bv

if D(O) ~ I

(9)

We conclude this section with the following lemma in order to characterize the behavior
of V(I.z.u. v) as a function of I and as a function of z. Given (9), the proof is a straightforward
derivation. Consequently, it is omitted.

Lemma 2. Given u. v. and z. V(I,z. u, v) is a continuous. non-decreasing, concave function ofI.
and it is differentiable everywhere. The same is true/or V(l.z.u. v) as a/unction o/zfor a given
u. v, and l.
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5.0 Computation of W(I,z,v): An Uncertainty Sub-Problem With Fixed Capacity
If e

~

z (i.e., if no leftovers remain after the first selling season), then uncertainty

continues to surround the value of e at the start

bf the second selling season, but the firm uses the

information obtained from market 1 to update its characterization of e at that time. In particular,
the firn;:t repl.aces A, the initial lower bound for the range of possible values of e, with z; and
revises the probability density function assigned to represent the likelihood that e = u fromJ(u)
to g:fu) EJ(u)/[I-F(z)] (see Lemma 3 of Petruzzi, 1995). Consequently, the updated cumulative
distribution function is G z (e)

E

f;gz(u)du = (F(e)-F(z)]/[l-F(z)]. However. the corresponding

hazard rate, hie), does not change:
J(e)/{l-F(z)]
= -::....:......;.;..,;.---..,;......:....;.=
(I-F(e)]/{ I-F(z)]

J(e) = h(e)
1- F( e)

Since no leftovers remain from market 1, the firm cannot supplement its initial inventory
on-hand (of 1 units) for market 2 by transferring units from market 1, which implies that x* = O.
Thus, given that at the beginning of the second selling season the firm sets its selling price at P7,
and observes that 11 = v, it enters market 2 with I units available in stock to satisfy a market
demand of D(P2Iv) = Y(P2Iv) +

e = a - bVP2 + e units, where e is unknown. Correspondingly,
1->(P2 Iv )

expectedmarket2sales = E[S(P2' I,z. v)] =

f IXP2 Iv )gzJu)du

B

+

f Igz(u)du
1->(PZlv)

Alternatively, we can define EzlD(P2Iv)], A/I-Y(P2Iv)), and ejl-y(p2Iv)) as the expected
demand, expected leftovers, and expected shortages, respectively, associated with market 2 (for

this sub-problem, wtiich is defined for e ~ z); and simplify the expression for £(S(P2,!,Z, v)]:
£[S(Pz.I.z. v)]

= £z/D(P2Iv)] - ejI-Y(P2 Iv ))

( 10)

or
£[S(P2'!'Z. v)] = 1- AlI-Y(P2Iv))

where
15

01 )

B

-

.Ez[D(P21 v)]

f (y( P2 1v) + e )gz(u)du
z

(12)

!-j(P2 Iv)1

A;: (!-Y(P2 Iv))

-

f[I - ()(P2 Iv) + e )k~(u)du

(13)

z

and
B

e;:(1-

Y(P2 Iv))

-

J[()(P2

Iv) +e)- I )gz(u)du

(14)

!-j(pzlv)

The contribution to profit associated with market 2 given that an optimal recourse policy
is followed for this sub-problem now can be written as:
W(I.

z, v) = max Q(P2. I. z. v)
P2

(15)

where
( 16)

Since I is determined prior to the first selling season, the stocking quantity for market 2
is fixed much like the number of seats on an airplane or the number of rooms in a hotel is fixed
at the time that the pricing decision is made. Consequently. in this case, the only way that the
firm can establish a desired safety stock for market 2 is by adjusting the expected demand (via
its' selling price), which again is analogous to the airline and hotel examples. In effect, the firm's
management situation at the beginning of the second selling season (given that demand
uncertainty still exists) resembles a yield management problem. Accordingly, our analysis of
this case reveals that the optimal decision rule for setting the market 2 selling price parallels the
familiar newsboy fractile rule that provides the optimal policy for establishing a safety stock in
the inverse situation in which the expected demand for a firm's product is fixed, but the stocking
quantity is a decision variable.
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Theorem 2. Given that at the beginning of the second selling season T]

= v. E ~ z. there are no

leftovers remaining after the first selling season. and I is the initial inventory on-hand. the firm'S
optimal recourse policy is (x*,P2*)

= (0. p(l.z,v)), where p(l.z,v) satisfies:
.)

G ( l-a+bvp(l.zv)
7

~

E[S(p(!,zv).I.z.v)]jbv
= ---=.-----~p(I.zv)

Proof: Consider the first and second partial derivatives of Q(P2,!,Z. v) taken with respect to P2'
From (16), (11), (13), and the definition ofY(P2Iv):
OQ(P2, I.
aP2

:-.

z, v) = E[S(P2. I. z. v) ] -

G (I
b )
bVP2 z -a+ vP2

and

Thus, Q(P2.l.Z. v) is concave in P2' which implies that P2 * is detennined implicitly for given
values of I,

z, and v as the

unique value of P2 that satisfies aQ(P2,I,Z. v)/OP2 = O. That is, the

market 2 optimal selling price for this case is P2 * == p(I,z. v), where:
G ( l-a+bvp(l.zv) )
7

~

E[S(p(!,zv). I.

z, v)]/bv

o

=.--"::"~--_---::':-

p(!,zv)

We offerthe following "newsboy-type" interpretation ofp(l,z.v). Since E/D(P2Iv)!

=a

- bVP2 + fzBUg/u)du. an increase of l/bv in P2 corresponds to a unit decrease in expected

demand. Thus, consider l/bv as the base unit for incrementing P2 and interpret a decision to
increase P2 by a sing!e increment instead as a decision to decrease expected demand by one unit.
Suppose, then, that the firm chooses to decrease expected demand by one unit and the one less
demand results in a leftover. This means that the firm loses a sale (since, if the firm does not
decrease demand by one unit, a unit of the firm's product exists in stock to satisfy it).
Consequently, the firm loses P2' the per-unit revenue associated with that lost sale. However,
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since the decrease in expected demand of one unit corresponds to an increase in price of llbv,
the firm generates an extra revenue of Ilbv for each sale that it does make, which offsets the lost
revenue of P2' Thus, the net per.:.unit expected Cost associated with the risk of having a unit
decrease in expected demand result in a unit leftover is (P2 - E[S(P2,1,Z.v)]lbv). We designate
this as the per-unit overage cost.
Now suppose that the firm chooses to increase expected demand by one unit and the one
extra demand results in a shorta~e. Since this is equivalent to the firm decreasing its per-unit
selling price by llbv, the firm sacrifices revenue in the amount of E[S(P2.I,Z. v)]lbv. But, since
[he extra unit of demand ends up exceeding its capacity, the firm does not make an additional
sale and consequently, it receives no additional revenue. Thus, the net per-unit expected cost
associated with the risk of having a unit increase in demand result in a shortage is
E[S(P2.I.Z. v)Jlbv. We designate this as the per-unit underage cost.

Therefore, the decision rule given in Theorem 2 parallels the familiar newsboy fractile
rule: it equates the probability of a leftover with the ratio of the firm's per-unit underage cost
and the sum of the per-unit underage and overage costs in order to determine the optimal safety
stock (i.e., P2* is determined from Pr{leftover in market 2) = underage/[underage + overage]).
Note, however, that p( I.z" v) is more difficult to compute than the solution to atypical newsboy
problem because the fractile (i.e., the RHS of the decision rule given in Theorem 2) is not a
constant; it varies with the decision variable.
We now can characterize W(l.z. v), which represents the optimal value of the firm's
recourse policy given that c. ;;:: z. From (16), (15), and Theorem 2:
. W(l.z. v)

= p( I.z. v) [I - i\.z(l-a+bvp(I.z, v))]

We conclude this section with the following two lemmas. They are useful for
characterizing the behavior of W(I,z, v) as a function of 1 and as a function of z.
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(17)

Lemma 3. Given v andz. p(I.z. v) is in general a unimodal function of I. first increasing and then
decreasing. However.

if the condition (a+z)h(z) ~ 1 is satisfied, then p(I.z. v) is non-increasing

for all 1.

Proof: For the purpose of this proof, define PI = p(I.z. v) and wI = 1 - a + bVPI' Given these
definitions, cross multiply the expression in Theorem 2, apply (11), and rearrange terms in order
to express PI explicitly as a function of W(

or

Thus.
apI
al

=

aN(wI) aWl
aWl

af =

apr

af

=

aN(wr)
aWl

[1

+ bv apr]

af

(18)

aN(wI)/awr
1- bv(aN(wI;/awI)

But,

Since aN(wr)lawr ~ 11bv. the denominator in the expression for aplla/ is non-negative;
therefore, the sign of apllal depends oniy on the sign of the numerator, aN(w/)law/. However,
notice that, except p~ssibly at the boundary point, wr

= B, the sign of aN(wr)law/ is determined

solely by the sign of N(w/) == 1 - bvN(wr)h(w/).
We verify next that N(wI) has at most one sign change, from positive to negative. This
means that in general, aN(wI)lawr is first positive and then negative; consequently. the same is
true for aplOI. That is, given that N(w/) has at most one sign change, from positive to
negative, PI is unimodal in I, first increasing and then decreasing.

19

where the inequality follows because ah(w/)/Owl ~ 0 (by the non-decreasing hazard rate
assumption) and aN(wI)/OwI

=[( I-GlwI))I(bv( 1+ GlwI)))] N(wI)'

Consequently,

In other words, once (or if) N(wI) becomes negative, it cannot become positive again.
Therefore, N(w I) changes sign at most one time -- from positive to negative -- which establishes
the claim that PI is unimodal in I.
Given the shape of N(wI)' a sufficient condition for PI to be monotone non-increasing
foralll, is for N(wI) ~ 0 for all wI' And since N(wI) cannot change sign from negative to
positive, if N(wI) is less than or equal to zero when evaluated at wI = z, then it is non-positive
for all wI of interest (because z is w's lower bound). That is, p/ is non-increasing in I if N(z) :::;

0, which is guaranteed if 1 ~ bvN(z)h(z). But, bvN(z)h(z)
(a+z)h(z)

Corollary.

aprI.z. v)/01

~.

~

I => bvN(z)h(z)

~

= (a+z)h(z).

1 =>

a;: ~

Therefore,

o

0

Ilbv

Proof: From (18):
l+bv

ap

/
aI

=

apI/aI
aN(wI)/awI

where PI == p(I.z. v). But, recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that aplOI ~ 0

¢:::>

aN(wI)/Ow/ ~ 0

(i.e., apldl and aN(wI)/Ow/ share the same sign for all!). Consequently, 1 + bv(ap//Ol) ~ O.

0

We find the first part of Lemma 3 somewhat curious. Intuitively, we expect p( I.z. v) and
I to be correlated negatively. This is because I represents the supply of the firm's product and
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p( t. z. v)

represents the firm's control over demand for its product. Thus, it seems reasonable to

believe that the firm should respond to a decrease in I (i.e., a decrease in supply) by
correspondingly triggering a decrease in demand, which is accomplished by a price increase.
Given this reasoning, the second part of Lemma 3, which establishes a condition ensuring that
p( I.z. v) is non-increasing in

(a+z)h(z)

~

I, seems more natural. We interpret the sufficient condition (i.e ..

1) as a requirement on the minimum size of the firm's market; and we argue by
I

example in the last section of this paper that this requirement is not restrictive. Therefore, we
posit that only under rare circumstances, characterized by cases in which the average size of the
firm's market is small relative to the variation in size due to uncertainty, does the complication
arise in which p( I.z. v) and I are correlated positively for some range of I.
Lemma 4. The following two relationships are true:

aW (I.aI z. v) = p(I.zv)[
(
)]
1-Gz I-a+bvp(I.zv)

(a)

aw(dZ
I. z. v)

(b)

Further.

iffor a given z,

= h(z){ W(I.z.v) (a+z)h(z)

~

0

p(I.zv) [a-bvp(I,zv)+z ]}

~

0

1. then the following also is true:

a2 W(I.z, v) <

(c)

~

aI2

0

-

Proof. To establish part (a) of the lemma. apply (17) and Theorem 2:
aW(I.z. v)
al

=

[
(I
b (I)]
[G (I b f ap(I.ZV J )]
= ap(I.zv)
dl
I-A: -a+ vp ,zv) +p(I,zv) 1- z -a+ vP(I, z v)\1+bv al

p(l.~vJ

{

l-G_(1-a+bvp(l.zvj)+bv
~

E[S(p(I,Zv), I. z. v)]/bv
~Ii op(I.,. v
-G.,.(I-a+bvp(I.Zvj) ,
.~
[
p(l,zv)
~
.
J of

= p(l,zv)[i-Gz(I-a+bvp(I,zv)]
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~ 0

J}

To establish part (b),
first notice from the definitions of giu) and A,.{J-y(p.,lv)) that the
~

~-

following identities hold:

and

=

f [I-(y(P2 Iv )+U)] a·g~u(u) du -

=

h(z)[Az(I - y(P2 1v)- (I - y(pzl v) - z)]

I-y(pzlv)

aA;: ( J-y(Pzlv) )

az

(I-y(Pzlv)-:)gz(:')

Then, given these identities, apply (17) and Theorem 2:
aw(;/,V)

=

ap~~Z,V)[I-Az(I-a+bvP(J,Z,V)]

+ P(I,Z,V){-h( z)[ A z (I - y(P21 v)- (I - Y(P21 v) - z)]- G;:(/-a+bvp(l,z,v ))bv ap~~Z.V)}

=

h(z){W(l,z, v) - p(!.z,v)[a-bvp(l,z,v)+z]}

= bvp(l,z,v )[E[S(p(I.zv), I, z. v)]/bv _ G,.(I-a+bvp(I.zv)] aprl.z,v)
p(I,z. v)
~
az

=

h(zJ{W(l,z.v) - p(I,z,vJ[a-bvp(!.z,v)+z]};:: 0

where the inequality follows because from (17) and (13).
To establish part (c), notice from part (a) that:
a 2W(I.z,v)
al 2

[ G (
)]
= ap(!.z,v)
aI
1- z I-a+bvp(!.z,v) -

$;

since, from the corollary

to

f

(
ap(l,Z.V))
p(!.z,v)gz I-a+bvp(!.z,v)\ l+bv al

apr!.z,v) [
]
aI
I-Gz(l-a+bvp(!.z,v)

Lemma 3, ap(I,z, v)/aI ;:: - Ilbv. But, from Lemma 3, ap(l.z, v)18l

o if (a+z)h(z) ~ I for a given z.

Therefore, in such a cas.e, a2W(I,z,v)/aJ2
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$;

O.

0

$;

6.0 Analysis of the Firm's Objective Function
Given the characterizations of V(I.z.u. v) and W(l.z. v) developed in the previous two
sections, we now return to the firm's objective function. Recall from (16) that the firm desires
to maximize jointly over z and I, the function rr(z.p(z),1), where p(z) is the value of p 1 that
maximizes rr(z.p 1,1) for given values of z and I. We proceed by taking the first partial
derivatives of rr(z.p(z)./) with respect to I and with respect to z. From (1)-(4):

arr (z. IXz). l)

al
= -c

d7t(z.!)

=---

al

+ SP[IzaV(I.Z.U, v)j(u)du + [l_F(z)]aW(I.z. V)]<b(V)dV

.

ex

aI

A

aI

(19)

'

and

arr(z. IXz).!)

az

=
aUZ.P1)

=

az

PI

=~z)

+

[(a+bc+E[E~2~P(Z)JaIXZ)

az

_

p[

]

zav(l,z.u,v)
aw(l,z.v).
+I I
j(u)du + V(l, z. z. v)!(z) + [1- F(z)]
- W(l, z. v)!(z) m(v)dv
A
~
~
ex

Or, applying Lemma 4:

arr(z. ~z).l)

az

P
=

+ I K(I, z, v)ql(v)dv
PI =~z) ex

(20)

where.
K(l,z.v) == IzaV(I.Z.U,V)F
J(u) d U + [ V(l,z.z,v)-p(l.z.v) [a- b vp(I.z.v)+z J]!(z)
A

az

(21 )

We point out that we do not take the second partials because we are unable to establish
any property, such as joint concavity, that guarantees the existence of an efficient method for
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idencifying 1* and :*. Thus, in the worst case, an exhaustive search over both decision variables,

z and I, is required to ensure the optimality of a particular policy. However, we note that it is
possible to detennine 1* analytically as a functi6n of z, thereby reducing significantly the
complexity of the search procedure, if we impose more restrictive conditions on the model
parameters. We offer two such possibilities as examples, the first of which we mention only
briefly, but the second of which we pursue thoroughly because it is central to the purpose of this
paper.
As the first example, suppose that foreign exchange risk did not exist: that is, assume that
the value of v is static, and it is known at the beginning of the first selling season (ror example,
because the firm locks into an exchange rate at the beginning of the first selling season or
because both markets are in the same country). In this case, the integral over d>(v) in (19)
reduces to its integrand, evaluated at thesingle value of v that represents the detenninistic
foreign exchange rate. As a result, using Lemmas 3 and 4, we could verify that in general, given
z, aTI(z.p(z),l)JaI = 0 is satisfied for at most two values of I, the larger of which corresponds to

1*. Thus, in the absence of foreign exchange risk, the firm's objective function reduces to a
maximization problem over the single variable

z.

Unfortunately, we are unable to verify a similar result in general (i.e., without further
assumptions) when uncertainty accompanies the foreign exchange rate, regardless of the form of
<j>(v). Therefore, weproceed instead as follows: first we establish a lower bound for

z* (which

applies even if v is fixed), and then we use that lower bound to provide a sufficient condition
that, if satisfied, ensures concavity of fI(z.p(z).!) in I for a given z in the region of interest.
Thus, if the sufficient condition is satisfied -- and we argue in the next section that the condition
is a mild one -- then the problem of jointly maximizing fI(z.p(z),!) over two variables (z and

n,

when foreign exchange risk exists, requires only a search over a truncated region of one of the
variables (z).
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Theorem 3. ::* 2: zs' where Zs denotes the optimal value ofz ifz were chosen myopically at the
beginning of the first selling season. without regard to its effect on the profit associated with
market 2. Tn other words. Zs = argmax{'¥(p(Z))L L(z.p(z))}. which is equivalent to the solution
of a corresponding single period problem.

Proof: The cornerstone of the proof is that K(I,z. v) 2: 0; consequently. we begin by establishing
that inequality. Notice from (21) that, given Lemma 2:
K(I.z, v) 2: [V(I.z.z.v) - p(l.z.v)[a - bvp(I.z.v) + zl}J(z)

Now consider the meaning of V(I.z.z. v): it represents the optimal value of the finn's
recourse policy for the degenerate case in which the demand for the second selling season is
deterministic as a function of the selling price (D = a + bVP2 + z) and an initial stock of
inventory is on-hand (I), but no leftovers remain from market 1. In this case, since no units exist
to

transfer from market 1 to market 2 (i.e.. since x* = 0), V( I.z.?, v) can be expressed in reduced

fonn. regardless of the value of I. In particular, from (7), (8), and the earlier conclusion that
D Z* Sf + x*: V(I,z,z.v) = p(DZ*)D Z* = maxD/p(Dz)D z }, wherep(D Z) = (a +z - D 2 )/bv.

Alternatively, we can invertp(D z ) and write: V(I.z,z.v) = maxp /P2(a. bvPZ + z)). In other
words, for a given value of I, V(I.z.z. v) maximizes the function pz{a - bvpz + zl and therefore,
V( I.z.z, v) 2: pz{a - bVP2 + zl for all values of pz, including P2 = p(I.z, v). This implies that
K( I,z. v) 2:

O.

Given that K(I.z,v) 2: 0, from (20):
aIT(z, p(7o), I)
- az

=

2:

d~ (p(z)) - L(z, P(z))]

dz

This implies that z*. the value of z that maximizes IT(z.p(z),z) is no less than zs. the value of z
that maximizes 'f:'(p(z)) - L(z.p(z)) (which follows because the slope of IT(z.p(z).z) is greater than
or equal to the slope of 'f:'(p(z)) - L(z.p(z)) at every value of z; see Topkis (1978)).
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0

We attribute the result of Theorem 3 to the strategic role that inventory plays in market 1.
By increasing its safety stock in the first selling !Season above the level it would set if future
considerations were not included (where

z serves as a substitute for safety stock). the firm

increases the likelihood that it will observe the value of e and consequently, operate in the
second selling season with perfect information regarding the demand function. Thus. there is an
economic incentive in terms of increased future profit to choose a higher safety stock in the first
selling season. And. although there is a cost associated with increasing

z because the increase

.

means higher expected leftovers in market 1, the cost is mitigated because the leftovers provide a
value in terms of greater flexibility since the firm has the recourse option of transferring some or
all of the leftovers to the second market for sale there.
Given Theorem 3 together with Lemmas 2 and 4, we next establish a condition that
ensures that rI(z.p(z).z) is concave in lover the region of z for which we are interested.
Interpretations of the condition are discussed in the next section.
Theorem 4. If (a + zs)h(zs) ;::: 1. then rI(z.p( z).z) is concave in I for any value of z ;::: zs'

Proof: First assume that (a + zs)h(zs) ;::: 1 and notice that the function (a + z)h(z) is nondecreasing in

z since h(.), the hazard rate associated with e, is non-decreasing.

This implies that

(a + z)h(z);::: 1 for all z;::: zs'

Next. consider the second partial derivative of fI(z.p(z).z) taken with respect l. From
(19):

a2rr(z. p(z).!)
aI2.

=

2
J~[fza2V(I,Zu.
v)!(u)du + [l_F(Z)]a W(I,z V)]<P(V)dV
2
ex

A

aI2

al

a

a

But, 2V(I.z.z. v)IdI2 ~ 0 for all z (by Lemma 2) and 2 W(I.z. v)ldJ2 ~ 0 for z ~ Zs (by Lemma 4

a

since (a + z)h( z) ;::: 1 for z ;::: zs)' Therefore, 2TI(z.p(z),!)IdI2 ~ 0 for z ~ zs. which implies that

D

rI(z.p(z),1) is concave in lover that region of z.
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7.0 Discussion
This paper focuses on a specific management situation in which a monopolist having
only a single opportunity to procure operates in two distinct markets that are separated by
international borders and have non-overlapping selling seasons. At the beginning of the first
selling season, the finn makes three decisions: the quantity to procure for market 1, the quantity
to procure for market 2, and the selling price to set for market 1. Then, at the beginning of the
second selling season. the finn implements two recourse decisions: the number of leftovers
remaining from market 1 to transfer to market 2 and the selling price to set for market 2.
A key result of the analysis is that this problem can be reduced to one involving only two
principal decision variables: I, the procurement quantity for market 2; and

z, a surrogate

representation of the safety stock for market 1. Given 1 and z, the firm's optimal course of
action then can be established. In particular, the optimal selling price and procurement quantity
for market 1 are determined myopically as a function of z. Similarly, the finn's optimal
recourse policy for market 2 is characterized completely in terms of 1 and z (the characterization,
however, depends on two observations made at the end of the first selling season: market 1 sales
and the value of the foreign exchange rate). The problem reduces further, to one that requires a
maximization over only the single variable, z, if the condition (a + zs)h( zs)

~

1 is satisfied, where

Zs represents the solution to a corresponding single-period problem. We now provide evidence

as justification for the earlier claims that this sufficiency condition is rather mild.
Given F(.), the subjective probability distribution originally assigned to characterize the
uncertainty term, €,

~efine

Zo such that F(zo) = 1 - F(zo) = 1/2 (i.e., Zo is the median). Notice

that although it is possible for Zs < zo, we argue that this is an unlikely event because such an
inequality would mean that in a single period problem, it is optimal for the probability of a
stockout to exceed 50%. Consequently, we assume that Zs
~ (a

+

zO)h( ZO)

~ zo,

which implies that

(cz

+

zs)h(z)

(recall that (a + z)h(z) is a non-decreasing function of z). This means that if (a +

zO)h(zO) ~ 1. then (a + zs)h(zsJ ~ 1. In other words, as long as a ~ 11h(zO) - zo' we can be
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confident chac che sufficiency condition is sacisfied. Basically, we choose zo as a conservacive
estimate of zs; however, we do so only for illustrative purposes since, without specifying
particular values for a. b, and c (in which case, we could compute an actual value for zs) it is
more convenient to work with zO°
In order co interpret further what it means for a ~ llh(za) - za, we consider three
specifications of F(.): the uniform distribution, the exponential distribution, and the normal
distribution (technically, the normal distribution is not a valid alternative because it allows for e

< -a. which is not meaningful; but as long as the probability that E < -a approaches zero, the
normal distribution can serve as an excellent approximation). Table 1 provides the necessary
data for each of these three cases (in the table, we let cr denote the standard deviation).
Table 1. Computation of llh(zo) - zo for Common Forms of F(e)
I

Measure

Uniform

f(z)

11(B-A)

E[e]

cr
zo
h(zO)
IIh(zO) - zo

I

I

Exponential

I

'Ae-"A.z

I

I
(B+A)12
I
(B-A)I(2 e 3 112 ) I

lfA.
lfA.

I
I

E[e]
(1I3 112 )/cr

I

(ln2)E[€]

I

(3 112 )cr - E[e]

1/cr

I
I

(2 - ln2)cr - E[e]

I

Normal

I

( 11(2rr.cr2 )112 )e-(x-~)2/(2(j)

I
I

I
I

I
I

I
I

I
I

Jl
cr
E[e]
(2/rr.) 112/cr
(7tI2)1I2 cr - Efe]

For the three distribution examples provided, Table 1 indicates that as long as a + E[E]
kcr, where k is roughly equal to 1.5 (k

~

= 3 112 for the uniform distribution, etc.), then the

sufficiency condition is satisfied (assuming that Zs ~ zo). Expressed differently, the sufficiency
test for each of the three examples requires that the coefficient of variation of the size of the
market (crl(a+E[eJ)) be not greater than roughly 213 (Ilk). And since it seems unlikely in any
practical situation that the initial uncertainty associated with the firm's market, as measured by cr,
would be more than half or two-thirds the expected size of the market, we conclude that the
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sufficiency condition identified to reduce the two market problem to a maximization over a
single decision variable is rather unrestrictive.
Finally, we point out that the results of this paper are robust with respect to the
characterization of the foreign exchange risk -- no assumptions are required on the specific form
of <1>(.). We attribute this phenomenon

to

the manner in which foreign exchange is incorporated

into the model: by introducing the exchange rate random variable as a multiplicative operator on
the elasticity parameter of the firm's price-dependent demand function, we effectively absorb the
monetary uncertainty into demand uncertainty.

8.0 Implications to Yield Management
Although the intent of this paper is to model explicitly a two-marketltwo-selling-season
management situation, consider the following single-period extension. A firm operating in a
single market has only one chance to procure and, because of a long procurement lead-time,
does so based on some preliminary characterization (F(.) of the uncertainty surrounding the
scale parameter of its price-dependent demand function (assume, as before, that D(p) = a - bp +
e). However, the firm is able to revise by some method its characterization of e just prior to the
start of the actual selling season, at which time it sets its selling price (for example, suppose the
firm establishes a better forecast due to updated economic indicators, or due to interest
stimulated by preliminary advertising). Consequently, when the firm sets its selling price, it
does so given a pre-specified capacity level -- the procurement amount -- and given an updated
characterization (G(.)) of the uncertainty surrounding the scale parameter of the demand
function.
This scenario represents a simplified version of the model developed in this paper. In
particular,

z and p j

are not decision variables since a first selling season does not exist (in this

context, by first selling season, we mean a selling season that occurs before the firm revises its
characterization of the uncertainty included in the demand function). Correspondingly, 'f'(p /) -

L( z,p j) = O. Consequently, the expected profit function is given by rt( I), where rt( I) does not
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include the integral over <P(v). In addition, the frrm's optimal recourse path is represented
completely by the solution to the sub-problem for which the function W( ) depicts the optimal
solution value. In other words, the possibility tbat the frrm sets its selling price in a
deterministic environment does not exist (in which case the function V( ) also would apply).
In summary. the results of this paper ensure that the problem described here -- which
might apply to certain yield management problems in which the frrm chooses a stocking quantity
(i.e., capacity level) at some point in time prior to establishing a demand level (i.e., selling price)
-- can be reduced to a maximization of a single variable function. The solution

to

the resulting

maximization problem then requires either an exhaustive search (in the worst case) or the
application of an analytical formula (depending on the model parameters). One example of a
frrm for which this management situation might apply is a grower of seasonal or holiday plants
and flowers since. due to the plant-development-time, the grower must decide the quantity of
plants to produce well in advance of establishing the selling price.
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